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        <title><![CDATA[Employment Law - Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 31 Aug 2025 13:28:52 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// The Shifting Legal Landscape of Employment Discrimination Cases]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-the-shifting-legal-landscape-concerning-employment-discrimination-cases/</link>
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                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 20:36:36 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Civil Litigation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[bias]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[civil rights act]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[discrimination]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment discrimination]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Although our law firm does not handle employment discrimination cases, we frequently refer such matters to excellent attorneys. Recently, however, I came across a particularly insightful and well-written Florida Bar Journal (volume 99, No. 4 July/August 2025) article by Attorney James Poindexter, which inspired me to write this blog. Employment discrimination cases are primarily grounded&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Although our law firm does not handle employment discrimination cases, we frequently refer such matters to excellent attorneys. Recently, however, I came across a particularly insightful and well-written Florida Bar Journal (volume 99, No. 4 July/August 2025) article by Attorney James Poindexter, which inspired me to write this blog.</p>



<p>Employment discrimination cases are primarily grounded in <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964</a>. Like all statutory law, Title VII has been shaped and refined through judicial interpretation, with courts across the country—including the United States Supreme Court—defining its scope and application.</p>



<p>For more than fifty years, one of the most influential cases in employment discrimination law has been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4011882228792863251&q=McDonnell+Douglas+Corp.+v.+Green&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green</em>, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)</a>, decided by the United States Supreme Court. The decision established a framework for plaintiffs to prove discrimination in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is absent.</p>



<p>Unfortunately, although once regarded as a lifeline for plaintiffs, the case has gradually evolved into more of an obstacle to proving even meritorious claims, ossifying into a rigid procedural doctrine. This shift stems from a misunderstanding of the framework’s purpose. Rather than treating it as one of several possible methods of proof, many courts and practitioners have mistakenly applied it as the exclusive route. Encouragingly, recent decisions have begun to clarify that the <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> framework is not the only path available.</p>



<p>These decisions reaffirm that the ultimate issue is ‘whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff,’ <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5618458359706638358&q=United+States+Postal+Service+Board+of+Governors+v.+Aikens&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens</em>, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)</a>, rather than whether the three-part framework of <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> has been mechanically satisfied. In effect, courts have recognized that, for some, the <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> test has come to overshadow—and at times supplant—the Civil Rights Act itself as the governing law.</p>



<p>A significant shift in how courts should view the <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> framework came in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9445364666925364919&q=Tynes+v.+Florida+Department+of+Juvenile+Justice&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Tynes v. Florida Department of Juvenile Justice</em>, 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023)</a>. In <em>Tynes</em>, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the employer sought to overturn it by arguing that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under <em>McDonnell Douglas</em>.</p>



<p>The <em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9445364666925364919&q=Tynes+v.+Florida+Department+of+Juvenile+Justice&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Tynes</a></em> court clarified that while <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> remains a valid method of proving discrimination, it is not the exclusive one. Most importantly, the court emphasized that the central question is whether unlawful discrimination occurred—not whether the plaintiff successfully cleared the procedural hurdles outlined in <em>McDonnell Douglas</em>. </p>



<p>Tynes’ message is that courts should analyze the evidence as a <strong>mosaic</strong>, considering all the pieces together to determine if a jury could reasonably conclude that unlawful discrimination occurred. This holistic approach aligns with the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.</p>



<p>Getting the Supreme Court to adopt the “mosaic” approach may be challenging. In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15757226883396223378&q=Hittle+v.+City+of+Stockton,+California&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Hittle v. City of Stockton, California</em>, 145 S. Ct. 759 (2025)</a>, the Court denied a petition for certiorari, thereby declining to review a Ninth Circuit opinion that required the plaintiff to satisfy the traditional <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> burden-shifting framework. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented from the denial, arguing that the Court should have used the case to reconsider the <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> framework.</p>



<p>Employment discrimination cases can be exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs, as federal courts are often inclined to grant summary judgment motions, dismissing the claims before they can be heard by a jury. However, the <em>Tynes</em> decision may signal a softening of this approach. By emphasizing the “mosaic” of evidence, the court encourages judges to look beyond the rigid, step-by-step framework of <em>McDonnell Douglas</em> and instead consider the totality of the circumstances, which may make it more difficult for defendants to obtain summary judgment.</p>



<p>*********************************************************</p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong>&nbsp;toll free at 866-785-GALE or by email (jgale@jeffgalelaw.com) for a free, confidential consultation to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><strong>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</strong>&nbsp;is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Why Florida Hospitals Often Avoid Responsibility for Emergency Room Mistakes]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-why-florida-hospitals-often-avoid-responsibility-for-emergency-room-mistakes/</link>
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                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2025 21:14:49 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Medical Malpractice]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[apparent agency hospital liability non-delegable duty Florida law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[emergency room mistakes]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[emergency room physician liability]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Florida hospital malpractice law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Florida medical malpractice exceptions]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Florida personal injury law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[healthcare negligence lawsuit]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[hospital duty of care]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[hospital liability for independent contractors]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[hospital not liable for ER doctor]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[independent contractor doctor lawsuit]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[malpractice insurance gaps]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[medical error compensation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[tort law in Florida]]></category>
                
                
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>Most people are surprised to learn that the physicians treating them in a hospital emergency room are often&nbsp;not&nbsp;hospital employees. Instead, they are typically&nbsp;independent contractors. An&nbsp;independent contractor&nbsp;is a person or entity that provides services under the terms of a contract rather than as a regular employee. These individuals work on an as-needed basis, often through their&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Most people are surprised to learn that the physicians treating them in a hospital emergency room are often&nbsp;<em>not</em>&nbsp;hospital employees. Instead, they are typically&nbsp;<strong>independent contractors</strong>.</p>



<p>An&nbsp;<em>independent contractor</em>&nbsp;is a person or entity that provides services under the terms of a contract rather than as a regular employee. These individuals work on an as-needed basis, often through their own companies or franchises, and are generally paid per job or shift—not through payroll like employees. While they may provide critical care inside hospital walls, they technically work for themselves or an outside group.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-legal-consequence">The Legal Consequence</h3>



<p>Because of this classification,&nbsp;<strong>hospitals are generally not liable</strong>&nbsp;for the negligence of independent contractor physicians. This rule has been upheld in multiple Florida cases, including:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14743554252932372030&q=Newbold-Ferguson+v.+Amisub+(North+Ridge+Hosp.,+Inc.)&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Newbold-Ferguson v. Amisub (North Ridge Hosp., Inc.)</em>, 85 So.3d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1168538149081735924&q=Shands+Teaching+Hosp.+%26+Clinic,+Inc.+v.+Juliana&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinic, Inc. v. Juliana</em>, 863 So.2d 343, 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)</a></li>



<li><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16095155483252931525&q=Pub.+Health+Trust+of+Dade+Cty.+v.+Valcin&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin</em>, 507 So.2d 596, 601 (Fla.1987)</a></li>
</ul>



<!--more-->



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-why-it-matters">Why It Matters</h3>



<p>This legal distinction can have serious consequences for patients and their families. Many independent ER doctors either do&nbsp;<strong>not carry malpractice insurance</strong>&nbsp;or have policy limits far too low to cover serious or catastrophic injuries caused by medical errors. When this happens, victims must look elsewhere for compensation—and the hospital is the most obvious alternative.</p>



<p>Fortunately,&nbsp;<strong>Florida law recognizes several exceptions</strong>&nbsp;to the general rule of non-liability. These exceptions can hold a hospital accountable under the right circumstances.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-exceptions-when-hospitals-may-be-liable"><strong>Key Exceptions: When Hospitals May Be Liable</strong></h3>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Apparent or Actual Agency</strong><br>If the physician is presented as an agent of the hospital—such that a reasonable patient would assume they are a hospital employee—the hospital may be liable.<br><em>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1240477928127860355&q=Roessler+v.+Novak&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Roessler v. Novak</a></em>, 858 So.2d 1158, 1161–62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).</li>



<li><strong>Negligent Hiring or Retention</strong><br>Hospitals have a duty to properly vet the medical professionals they allow on staff. If they fail to exercise due care in selecting or keeping a physician with known issues, they can be held responsible.<br><em>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2186478964273550240&q=Insinga+v.+LaBella&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Insinga v. LaBella</a></em>, 543 So.2d 209, 214 (Fla.1989).</li>



<li><strong>Non-Delegable Duty</strong><br>In some cases, a hospital cannot escape liability by contracting out certain responsibilities. This may be the case when a duty is imposed by <strong>statute, regulation, contract</strong>, or <strong>common law</strong>, especially in ER settings.<br><em>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1679830572817119418&q=Pope+v.+Winter+Park+Healthcare+Group,+Ltd.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Pope v. Winter Park Healthcare Group, Ltd.</a></em>, 939 So.2d 185, 187–88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).</li>
</ol>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-bottom-line"><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h3>



<p>Hospitals have many valid business reasons for contracting with independent physicians—cost efficiency, staffing flexibility, and reducing administrative overhead among them. But&nbsp;<strong>shielding themselves from liability for medical negligence should not be one of them</strong>.</p>



<p>When independent doctors make serious mistakes, the legal classification of “independent contractor” should not become a barrier to justice for injured patients.</p>



<p>*********************************************************<br><strong>Contact us</strong>&nbsp;at 305-758-4900 or by email (jgale@jeffgalelaw.com & kgale@jeffgalelaw.com) for a free, confidential consultation to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><strong>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</strong>&nbsp;is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // “At-Will” is (Mostly) the Law of the Land]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-at-will-employment-is-the-law-of-the-land/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-at-will-employment-is-the-law-of-the-land/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 21:50:01 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[at-will employment]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[demotion]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[discrimination]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment discharge]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[job loss]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[wrongful termination]]></category>
                
                
                
                    <media:thumbnail url="https://jeffgalelaw-com.justia.site/wp-content/uploads/sites/560/2025/01/img_5418.jpg" />
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>At-will employment allows employers to adjust the terms of employment with employees at any time, with or without notice, for any reason, and without legal consequence. Montana is the only state that is not an at-will employment state. At-will employment not only subjects employees to arbitrary terminations and reductions in hours, it discourages employees from&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>At-will employment allows employers to adjust the terms of employment with employees at any time, with or without notice, for any reason, and without legal consequence. Montana is the only state that is not an at-will employment state.</p>



<p>At-will employment not only subjects employees to arbitrary terminations and reductions in hours, it discourages employees from making legitimate internal complaints about company operations.</p>



<p>Some cities and states have carved out exceptions to the at-will law. However, the exceptions are mostly limited in scope to government employees. New York City enacted a law to protect employees of large fast-food restaurant chains in the city.</p>



<p>Collective bargaining agreements forged by unions also include exceptions. They can cover goverment and private business employees.</p>



<p>The exceptions typically apply a “just cause” or “good cause” standard. Just cause under New York City’s law, the <a href="https://www.nyc.gov/site/dca/workers/workersrights/fastfood-retail-workers.page" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Wrongful Discharge of Fast Food Employees</a> law, is defined as “the fast food employee’s failure to satisfactorily perform job duties or misconduct that is demonstrably and materially harmful to to the fast food employer’s legitimate business interests.”</p>



<p>Where “just cause” or “good cause” are the standards, the burden is on the employer to establish compliance.</p>



<p>Other exceptions have emerged. They are:</p>



<p><strong>Public policy exception.</strong> In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6106113470135055631&q=tameny+v+atlantic+richfield+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.</em>, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980)</a>, the Supreme Court of California allowed an employee to proceed with a lawsuit against his employer in an at-will state based on the claim he was discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme. The Court explained:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Over the past several decades, however, judicial authorities in California and throughout the United States have established the rule that under both common law and the statute an employer does not enjoy an absolute or totally unfettered right to discharge even an at-will employee. In a series of cases arising out of a variety of factual settings in which a discharge clearly violated an express statutory objective or undermined a firmly established principle of public policy, courts have recognized that an employer’s traditional broad authority to discharge an at-will employee “may be limited by statute … or by considerations of public policy.” (<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3383685648659964078&q=tameny+v+atlantic+richfield+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Petermann</em> v. <em>International Brotherhood of Teamsters</em> (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 188 [344 P.2d 25]</a> (discharge for refusal to commit perjury); see, e.g., <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10923811083495696241&q=tameny+v+atlantic+richfield+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Glenn</em> v. <em>Clearman’s Golden Cock Inn, Inc.</em> (1961) 192 Cal. App.2d 793, 796-797 [13 Cal. Rptr. 769]</a> (discharge because of union membership and activity); <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10455249703314662268&q=tameny+v+atlantic+richfield+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Wetherton</em> v. <em>Growers Farm Labor Assn.</em> (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 168, 174-175 [79 Cal. Rptr. 543] (same)</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10455249703314662268&q=tameny+v+atlantic+richfield+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Montalvo</em> v. <em>Zamora</em> (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 69 [86 Cal. Rptr. 401] (discharge for designation of nonunion bargaining representative)</a>; <em>Nees</em> v. <em>Hocks</em> (1975) 272 Ore. 210 [536 P.2d 512] (discharge for serving on jury); <em>Frampton</em> v. <em>Central Indiana Gas Company</em> (1973) 260 Ind. 249 [297 N.E.2d 425] (discharge for filing worker’s compensation claim); <em>Harless</em> v. <em>First Nat. Bank in Fairmont</em> (1978) ___ W. Va. ___ [246 S.E.2d 270] (discharge for reporting violations of consumer protection laws).)</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
<strong>Good faith exception. </strong>The goal of this exception is “simply to deny to [the employer] any readily definable, financial windfall resulting from the denial to [the employee] of compensation for past services.” <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13516271953731184461&q=mccone+v+new+england+telephone+%26+telegraph+co&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Gram</em> v. <em>Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,</em> 391 Mass. 333, 335 (1984) (<em>Gram II</em>)</a>. It does not appear to protect employees against demotion or termination.</p>



<p><strong>Implied contract exception.</strong> In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8943506654908657222&q=continental+air+lines+inc+v+keenan&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Kennan</em>, 731 P.2d 708</a>, the Supreme Court of Colorado accepted certiorari review “to determine whether an employee may sue an employer for breach of contract on the theory that an employee manual, unilaterally published by the employer, may serve as a basis for altering the terms of an employment otherwise terminable at will.” It issued the following guidelines:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>An employee originally hired under a contract terminable at will may be able to enforce the termination procedures in an employee manual under one of the following alternative theories. The employee may be entitled to relief under ordinary contract principles if he can demonstrate, first, that in promulgating the termination procedures the employer was making an offer to the employee—that is, the employer manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the employee’s assent would conclude the bargain, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981)—and second, that his initial or continued employment constituted acceptance of and consideration for those procedures. <em>See, e.g., </em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5880821795213521136&q=continental+air+lines+inc+v+keenan&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Dahl,</em> 227 Md. 471, 712*712 356 A.2d 221</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8141628573245983440&q=continental+air+lines+inc+v+keenan&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Pine River State Bank,</em> 333 N.W.2d 622</a>; <em>Southwest Gas Corp.,</em> 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261; <em>Langdon,</em> 569 P.2d 524; <em>Hercules Powder Co.,</em> 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804.</p>



<p>Alternatively, even if the requisites for formation of a contract are not found, the employee would be entitled to enforce the termination procedures under a theory of promissory estoppel if he can demonstrate that the employer should reasonably have expected the employee to consider the employee manual as a commitment from the employer to follow the termination procedures, that the employee reasonably relied on the termination procedures to his detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the termination procedures. <em>See, e.g., Cleary,</em> 111 Cal.App.3d 443, 168 Cal.Rptr. 722; <em>Toussaint,</em> 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880; <em>Arie,</em> 648 S.W.2d 142; <em>Thompson,</em> 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081; <em>see also </em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18293269166576579553&q=continental+air+lines+inc+v+keenan&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Kiely v. St. Germain,</em> 670 P.2d 764 (Colo.1983)</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7435749330558839636&q=continental+air+lines+inc+v+keenan&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority,</em> 646 P.2d 900 (Colo.1982)</a>; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 2 and 90 (1981). Unless this preliminary factual showing is sufficient to overcome the presumption of an employment terminable at the will of either party, the employee’s cause of action should fail.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
<strong>Other constraints on Florida’s at-will employment law include:</strong>
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964</a>. Prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin.</li>



<li><a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Florida Statute 440.205</a>. “<strong>Coercion of employees.</strong>—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.”</li>
</ul>



<p>Our office receives many inquiries from terminated or demoted employees about their rights. Unfortunately, most of them are not afforded any of the above-discussed protections against Florida’s at-will law. </p>



<p><strong>*********************</strong> </p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> at 305-758-4900 or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><a href="/">Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</a> is a <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=south+florida&rls=com.microsoft:en-US:IE-Address&rlz=1I7MXGB_enUS635&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_sKjTobrQAhUBhiYKHea4CPIQ_AUICigD&biw=1097&bih=498" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">South Florida</a> based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>



<p><strong>DISCLAIMER</strong>: This information provided by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is for informational purposes only and is intended to be used as a non-legal guide prior to consultation with an attorney familiar with your specific legal situation. It should not be considered legal advice or counseling. No such legal advice or counseling is either expressly or impliedly intended. This  information is not a substitute for the advice or counsel of an attorney. If you require legal advice, you should seek the services of an attorney.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Procedure for Florida Workers’ Compensation One-Time (1x) Change Request]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-procedure-for-florida-workers-compensation-one-time-1x-change-request/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-procedure-for-florida-workers-compensation-one-time-1x-change-request/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2023 23:07:50 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[1x change]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[440.13(2)(f)]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[authorized medical]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[florida bar rule 4-4.2]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[medical]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[one-time change]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[workers' compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                    <media:thumbnail url="https://jeffgalelaw-com.justia.site/wp-content/uploads/sites/560/2023/11/laptop-work-1260785-m-1.jpg" />
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>For the most part, Florida workers involved in industrial accidents have little control over which medical providers are authorized to treat them under the state’s workers’ compensation system. Control of the medical care is mostly held by the employers and their workers’ compensation insurance carriers (E/C). Section 440.13, Florida Statutes lays out the parameters regarding&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>For the most part, Florida workers involved in industrial accidents have little control over which medical providers are authorized to treat them under <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0400-0499/0440/0440ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2019&Title=%2D%3E2019%2D%3EChapter%20440" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">the state’s workers’ compensation system</a>. Control of the medical care is mostly held by the employers and their workers’ compensation insurance carriers (E/C). <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.13.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Section 440.13, Florida Statutes</a> lays out the parameters regarding the provision and control of medical care.</p>



<p>Control impacts the nature and quality of medical care received, the receipt of indemnity (money) benefits, and settlement value. Doctors selected by E/C tend to render opinions favoring E/C. Injured workers have limited ability to wrest control of their care from E/C.</p>



<p><a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.13.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">440.13(2)(f)</a> lets injured workers ask E/C to authorize another treating doctor. Barring exceptional circumstances, the request can only be made one time in each case. E/C has five days from receipt of the request to select another doctor of its choosing or lose the right. If the selection is not made within the five days, the injured worker, also known as the claimant, gets to select the doctor. This doctor then becomes authorized. This is a big deal.</p>



<p>Neither the statute nor case law are fully clear on the proper procedure for making the request. The statute reads that “Upon the written request of the employee, the carrier shall give the employee the opportunity for one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident,” so we know the request must be in writing. Case law even tells us that the writing can take many forms — <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13138002451994049194&q=Andrews+v+McKim&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Andrews v McKim</em>, 355 So.3d 957, 962 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 2023)</a>:
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Email.</strong> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7345030962815331787&q=Bustamante+v.+Amber+Construction+Company&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Bustamante v. Amber Construction Company</em>, 118 So.3d 921 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 2013)</a></li>



<li><strong>Grievance form.</strong> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17420794812393064525&q=Harrell+v.+Citrus+County+School+Board&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Harrell v. Citrus County School Board</em>, 25 So.3d 675 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 2010)</a></li>



<li><strong>Petition for Benefits.</strong> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7728524808255020140&q=HMSHost+Corporation/Gallagher+Bassett+Services,+Inc.,+v.+Frederic&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>HMSHost Corporation/Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.</em>, v. <em>Frederic</em>, 102 So.3d 668 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 2012)</a></li>



<li><em><strong>Telefax.</strong> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14763290808112156690&q=Zekanovic+v.+American+II,+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Zekanovic v. American II, Corp.</a></em>, 208 So.3d 851 (Fla. 1<sup>st</sup> DCA 2017)</li>
</ul>



<p>
What’s unclear is to whom the request can or must be sent. The main choices are the insurance adjuster and the carrier’s attorney.</p>



<p><a href="https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2023/11/2024_05-NOV-Chapter-4-RRTFB-11-6-2023-1.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Bar Rule 4-4.2(a)</a> provides as follows:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>In representing a client, a lawyer must not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer. Notwithstanding<br>the foregoing, a lawyer may, without such prior consent, communicate with another’s client to meet the requirements of any court rule, statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on a person, in which event the communication is strictly<br>restricted to that required by the court rule, statute or contract, and a copy must be provided to the person’s lawyer.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
In my view, this Rule blocks lawyers from sending the 1x change request to the adjuster of a represented carrier. While the statute requires a written request, it does not mandate that the request be sent to the adjuster. Therefore, notice upon the lawyer should satisfy the statute.</p>



<p>Rule 60Q-6.104 of the <a href="https://www.jcc.state.fl.us/JCC/rules/#60Q-6.104" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Rules of Procedure for Workers’ Compensation Proceedings</a>, instructs attorneys on making their email addresses known. In addition to the lawyer’s email, the list may include assistants’ emails and one specifically for pleadings. To avoid challenges regarding the effectiveness of an emailed 1x change request, the safest route is to send the request to all of the emails listed by the attorney. Moreover, to be doubly safe, the subject line should begin with the words “SERVICE OF OJCC DOCUMENT” in all capital letters followed by the name of the injured worker, employer, and OJCC number, to comply with Rule 60Q-6.108(2)(f), and should include language making it explicitly clear that a 1x change is being requested to avoid any implication of trying to sneak the request past the carrier. <em>See <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16485745089441008668&q=Gonzalez+v.+Quinco+Elec.+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Gonzalez v. Quinco Elec.</a></em> <em>Inc.</em>, 171 So.3d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).</p>



<p>Given the importance of controlling the medical, most E/C lawyers and their staff are on full alert for 1x change requests. Rarely do they drop the ball by failing to respond within five days. In a request we made last week, emailed to the lawyer and his assistant, the lawyer responded within three hours of the request with the name of another doctor and appointment information.</p>



<p><strong>********************</strong></p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> at 305-758-4900 or by email (jgale@jeffgalelaw.com and kgale@jeffgalelaw.com) to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><a href="/">Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</a> is a <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=south+florida&rls=com.microsoft:en-US:IE-Address&rlz=1I7MXGB_enUS635&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_sKjTobrQAhUBhiYKHea4CPIQ_AUICigD&biw=1097&bih=498" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">South Florida</a> based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>



<p><strong>DISCLAIMER</strong>: This information provided by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is for informational purposes only and is intended to be used as a non-legal guide prior to consultation with an attorney familiar with your specific legal situation. It should not be considered legal advice or counseling. No such legal advice or counseling is either expressly or impliedly intended. This  information is not a substitute for the advice or counsel of an attorney. If you require legal advice, you should seek the services of an attorney.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Workers’ Compensation Immunity for Florida Contractors and Subcontractors]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-workers-compensation-immunity-for-florida-contractors/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-workers-compensation-immunity-for-florida-contractors/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 08 Sep 2023 12:54:42 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Civil Litigation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Personal Injury]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[contractor subcontractor]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[horizontal immunity]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[subcontractor liability]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[vertical immunity]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[workers' compensation immunity]]></category>
                
                
                
                    <media:thumbnail url="https://jeffgalelaw-com.justia.site/wp-content/uploads/sites/560/2022/08/worker2.jpg" />
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>It is sometimes possible for employees injured on the job in Florida to be compensated through both the state’s workers’ compensation system and its civil justice system. As to the compensation available and the manner in which the compensation is sought and received, the systems are more different than they are alike. One of the&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>It is sometimes possible for employees injured on the job in Florida to be compensated through both <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0400-0499/0440/0440ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2019&Title=%2D%3E2019%2D%3EChapter%20440" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">the state’s workers’ compensation system</a> and its civil justice system. As to the compensation available and the manner in which the compensation is sought and received, the systems are more different than they are alike. One of the primary differences is that compensation for human damages such as bodily injury, pain and suffering, disfigurement, mental anguish, and the loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, are elements of a civil remedy but not workers’ compensation. In a nutshell, workers’ compensation benefits are limited to <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.13.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">medical</a> and <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.15.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">indemnity benefits</a>. <a href="https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/non-economic-damages/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Non-economic damages</a>, which can amount to millions of dollars, are not recoverable.</p>



<p>What limits most employees from being able to receive the civil remedy is the legal concept known as workers’ compensation immunity. The basic concept is set forth in <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.11.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Fla. Stat. Sec. 440.11(1)</a>:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>The liability of an employer prescribed in <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">s. 440.10</a> shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability, including vicarious liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death….</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
Special laws have been devised to deal with workers’ compensation immunity in the context of contractor-subcontractor relationships. <em>See</em> <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Fla. Stat. Sec. 440.10(b)-(f)</a>. For the employees of contractors and subcontractors, the general law is set forth in <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">s. 440.10(b)</a>:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his or her contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
“[T]he purpose of section 440.10 . . . [is] ‘to insure [sic] that a particular industry will be financially responsible for injuries to those employees working in it, even though the prime contractor employs an independent contractor to perform part or all of its contractual undertaking.’” <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2216645094632896241&q=Gator+Freightways,+Inc.+v.+Roberts&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Roberts</em>, 550 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 1989)</a> (quoting <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9415142049467477064&q=Roberts+v.+Gator+Freightways,+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Roberts v. Gator Freightways, Inc</em>., 538 So. 2d 55, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989))</a>; see also <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6303831111863713254&q=Crum+Servs.+v.+Lopez&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Crum Servs. v. Lopez</em>, 975 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)</a> (explaining that section <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">440.10(1)(b)</a> “is designed to ensure that employees engaged in the same contract work are covered by workers’ compensation, regardless of whether they are employees of the general contractor or its subcontractor”).</p>



<p>Some people read <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">s. 440.10</a> to mean that every contractor or subcontractor working on a common project shares immunity from any claim asserted by any employee of any of them. This overstates the concept. Florida courts have recognized time and again that <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">s. 440.10(1)(b)</a> applies only when a contractor has sublet—that is, subcontracted—part of a contract. <em>See, e.g.</em>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16735946740810508093&q=Jones+v.+Florida+Power+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Jones v. Florida Power Corp.</em>, 72 So. 2d 285, 289 (Fla. 1954)</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3856468998539038412&q=Rabon+v.+Inn+of+Lake+City,+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Rabon v. Inn of Lake City, Inc.</em>, 693 So. 2d 1126, 1130–32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)</a>; <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12408562134620386482&q=Sotomayor+v.+Huntington+Broward+Assocs.+L.P.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Sotomayor v. Huntington Broward Assocs. L.P.</em>, 697 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)</a>.</p>



<p>In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7805155145077496759&q=galue+v+clopay+corporation&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Galue v. Clopay Corporation, et al.</em>, (Fla. 3rd DCA 2023)</a>, Clopay was a tenant under a lease agreement obligating it to “use the Premises in compliance with all federal, state, local, and municipal laws, orders, judgments, ordinances, regulations, codes, directives, permits, licenses, covenants and restrictions . . . applicable to the Premises.” Clopay hired Florida Fire Safety to conduct an inspection of the premises. Galue, who was a technician for FFS, was injured while performing the inspection. Galue then brought an action in state court against Clopay and one of its employees (Julian) for the injuries he sustained in the incident, alleging claims for negligence against both Clopay and Julian, and <a href="https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/vicarious-liability-respondeat-superior/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">vicarious liability</a> against Clopay. Clopay and Julian each answered and raised <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.11.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">worker’s compensation immunity</a> as an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirmative_defense" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">affirmative defense</a>. Clopay moved for summary judgment asserting that Galue’s action was barred by worker’s compensation immunity. The trial court granted <a href="https://casetext.com/rule/florida-court-rules/florida-rules-of-civil-procedure/rules/rule-1510-summary-judgment" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">summary judgment</a>, reasoning that Coplay delegated its contractual obligation under the lease to Florida Fire Safety. The trial court was reversed on appeal.  The Third DCA concluded that because the language relied on by Coplay in moving for summary judgment did not obligate it to perform a job or service for the landlord, Coplay was not contractually bound to perform the service it hired FFS to perform. Hence, as the statutory terms “contractor” and “contract work” plainly and unambiguously contemplate a party performing work pursuant to a contract with another, Coplay did not qualify as an employer.</p>



<p>The concept that <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">s. 440.10(1)(b)</a> applies only when a contractor has sublet—that is, subcontracted part of a contract — is demonstrated clearly in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5815096779471181335&q=Heredia+v.+John+Beach+%26+Assocs.,+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Heredia v. John Beach & Associates</em>, 278 So.3d 194 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2019)</a>. Lennar Homes hired two companies to perform different jobs on a tract of land it was developing. Heredia, an employee of one of the companies was injured by an employee of the other company. He sued the employee and his employer (under vicarious liability) for negligence. The trial judge granted summary judgment for the defendants under s. 440.10. The DCA reversed,  deciding as follows:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>There is no record evidence before us that Lennar was performing any work, of any kind, on behalf of any third party with respect to the Oaks at Shady Creek development. To the contrary, the evidence thus far tends to show that Lennar was acting on its own behalf as the owner of its own property.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
These principles were illustrated in <em>Witzman v. Sunderland Trucking, LLC</em>, 2019 WL 7347177 (Signed 09/03/2019), in a trial court Order denying summary judgment:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>[C]onsider an owner we’ll call A who contracts with B to build an office. B subcontracts with C to install a roof and with D to pour a driveway. If an employee of C negligently drops roofing tiles on an employee of D, causing injury, workers’ compensation immunity protects C and its employee from claims by D’s employee. This is so because § 440.10(1)(b) makes B, C, and D “one and the same business or establishment.”</p>



<p>Alternatively, consider an owner A who, in the course of building an office for itself, contracts with C to install a roof and with D to pour a driveway. There is no subcontract. If an employee of C negligently drops roofing tiles on an employee of D, causing injury, workers’ compensation immunity does not protect C and its employee from claims by D’s employee. Under § 440.10(1)(b), nobody has “sublet” anything; C and D are not “one and the same business or establishment.”</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
One more example: In <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9307861933736612732&q=Cuero+v.+Ryland+Grp.,+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Cuero v. Ryland Group, Inc</em>., 849 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003)</a>, Ryland, the owner/developer of the complex and the general contractor, sought workers’ compensation immunity under s. 440.10. It had entered into a contract with Sunfish Framing and Construction, Inc., to do framing work on the project. Sunfish subcontracted a portion of its work to Carlos Maldonado who in turn contracted with Diego Gallego to complete the application of the plywood sheathing on the roof. Gallego hired Luis Cuero to assist him. Cuero was involved in a serious accident and brought a negligence action against Ryland. Summary judgment in favor of Ryland was reversed on appeal. The District Court of Appeals found that Ryland was constructing the townhomes as a commercial business venture for itself and not as a result of contractual obligations to third parties.</p>



<p>The principles set forth in this blog show the importance of performing a thorough investigation of the contractual and legal status of the various parties.</p>



<p><strong>********************</strong></p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> at 305-758-4900 or by email (jgale@jeffgalelaw.com and kgale@jeffgalelaw.com) to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><a href="/">Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</a> is a <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=south+florida&rls=com.microsoft:en-US:IE-Address&rlz=1I7MXGB_enUS635&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_sKjTobrQAhUBhiYKHea4CPIQ_AUICigD&biw=1097&bih=498" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">South Florida</a> based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>



<p><strong>DISCLAIMER</strong>: This information provided by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is for informational purposes only and is intended to be used as a non-legal guide prior to consultation with an attorney familiar with your specific legal situation. It should not be considered legal advice or counseling. No such legal advice or counseling is either expressly or impliedly intended. This  information is not a substitute for the advice or counsel of an attorney. If you require legal advice, you should seek the services of an attorney.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale // Florida Statute 440.205 Workers’ Compensation Retaliation/Wrongful Termination COA (Prong #3)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-florida-statute-440-205-workers-compensation-retaliationwrongful-termination-coa-prong-3/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-florida-statute-440-205-workers-compensation-retaliationwrongful-termination-coa-prong-3/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2015 19:40:20 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>In previous blogs, we addressed the first and second elements of a Section 440.205 Florida Statutes wrongful retaliation/termination cause of action. This blog will address prong the third element. §440.205 reads as follows: Coercion of employees.—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/09/scales-of-justice-300x203.jpg" alt="scales of justice" style="width:300px;height:203px"/></figure></div>


<p>In previous blogs, we addressed the <a href="https://www.floridainjuryattorneyblawg.com/2015/09/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-florida-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-440-205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">first</a> and <a href="https://www.floridainjuryattorneyblawg.com/2015/09/jeffrey-p-gale-florida-statute-440-205-workers-compensation-retaliation-coa-prong-2.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">second</a> elements of a <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Section 440.205 Florida Statutes</a> wrongful retaliation/termination cause of action. This blog will address prong the third element.</p>



<p><a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">§440.205</a> reads as follows:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p><strong>Coercion of employees.</strong>—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
Case law has broken this cause of action down into the following elements:
</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>The employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity;</li>



<li>An adverse employment action occurred; and</li>



<li>The adverse action was causally related to the employee’s protected activity.</li>
</ol>



<p>
<a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18185359668396517924&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp</em>., 887 So.2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)</a>; and <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15263011901036264083&q=Bruner+v.+GC-GW+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Humphrey v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co.,</em> 192 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2002)</a>.</p>



<p>In order to satisfy the “causal connection” prong of a prima facie retaliation case, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, generally establish that the defendant was actually aware of the protected expression at the time the defendant took the adverse employment action. <em>See <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1043391209078009674&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Raney v. Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir.1997)</a> </em>(citing <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14094210043237435565&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Goldsmith v. City of Atmore,</em> 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir.1993))</a>. Moreover, while awareness of protected expression may be premised upon circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must show a defendant’s awareness with more evidence than mere curious timing coupled with speculative possibilities. <em>See id.</em> at 1197.</p>



<p>Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving only that the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated, see <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15115481215902771626&q=Ortega+v.+Engineering+Systems+Tech.+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Higdon v. Jackson</em>, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)</a>, the burden then shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18185359668396517924&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp.</em>, 887 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2004)</a>. If the defendant proffers evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse action, a plaintiff withstands summary adjudication either by producing sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude the employer’s proffered reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct, or that the proffered reasons are not worthy of belief. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4390354333854152686&q=Ortega+v.+Engineering+Systems+Tech.+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A.</em>, No. 08-12199, 2009 WL 4432654, at * 20 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2009)</a>. A trial court should “evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (internal citations omitted).</p>



<p>While temporal proximity between the protected activity and an adverse action may be sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal connection for purposes of a prima facie case, <em>see</em> <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17911175022910818062&q=Ortega+v.+Engineering+Systems+Tech.+Inc.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Ortega v. Engineering Systems Technology, Inc</em>., 30 So.3d 525 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2010)</a>, the real battle will be fought over the legitimacy of the employer’s adverse action. While there are a countless number of factors to consider in determining the real basis for a termination, it is always important to analyze the employee’s personnel file and the employer’s policies and procedures should be considered closely. Interestingly, a wrongful termination cannot be undone by demonstrating that the employee could have been, but wasn’t, terminated for violating a particular procedure. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10376742331191215191&q=Hodges+v.+Citrus+World,+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Hodges v. Citrus World, Inc.,</em> 850 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003)</a>.</p>



<p>Employees often have a good sense of why they were terminated. However, they must be careful to guard against allowing anger and disappointment to lead them into a false belief. Since our law firm also handles <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0400-0499/0440/0440ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2015&Title=%2D%3E2015%2D%3EChapter%20440" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">workers’ compensation cases</a>, we find it helpful to conduct discovery in the workers’ compensation case with regard to issues related to a potential 440.205 claim before bringing suit.</p>



<p>**********************</p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> toll free at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale // Florida Statute 440.205 Workers’ Compensation Retaliation/Wrongful Termination COA (Prong #2)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-florida-statute-440-205-workers-compensation-retaliation-coa-prong-2/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-florida-statute-440-205-workers-compensation-retaliation-coa-prong-2/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2015 16:50:06 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Our previous blog addressed the first prong of a Florida Statute §440.205 workers’ compensation retaliation/wrongful termination cause of action (COA). §440.205 provides: Coercion of employees.—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/09/pinoccio.jpg" alt="pinoccio" style="width:175px;height:199px"/></figure></div>


<p><a href="https://www.floridainjuryattorneyblawg.com/2015/09/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-florida-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-440-205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Our previous blog</a> addressed the first prong of a <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Statute §440.205</a> workers’ compensation retaliation/wrongful termination <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cause_of_action" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">cause of action (COA)</a>. <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">§440.205</a> provides:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p><strong>Coercion of employees.</strong>—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
Case law has established the elements of a <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">§440.205</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cause_of_action" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">COA</a> as follows: the employee must prove: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the employee’s protected activity. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18185359668396517924&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp</em>., 887 So.2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)</a>; and <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15263011901036264083&q=Bruner+v.+GC-GW+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Humphrey v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co.,</em> 192 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2002)</a>.</p>



<p>This blog will address prong (2).</p>



<p>The statute does not require an outright termination for an employer’s conduct to be actionable. <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Section 440.205</a> creates a cause of action for intimidation or coercion even in the absence of a discharge. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11170455901826516909&q=chase+v+walgreen,+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Chase v. Walgreen Co</em>., 750 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)</a>. In <em>Chase</em>, an employee, who remained employed by the Defendant when the lawsuit was instituted, was allowed to proceed with her action [against the employer] on the following allegations of wrongdoing: (1) failing to comply with physician ordered work restrictions; (2) reducing scheduled work hours resulting in decreased income and loss of eligibility for employee insurance and other benefits; (3) refusing Chase’s request for transfer to another store located closer to her residence despite the open positions at that store; (4) making changes to Chase’s work schedule without prior notice “in an effort to depict Chase as an absentee”; and (5) berating Chase in a “humiliating manner for pretextual violations of company policy or practice.” (Chase sought economic damages, including back pay and the value of any lost benefits with interest, and noneconomic damages, including “damages for mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment.”)</p>



<p>Similarly, in <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7406999262655374666&q=chase+v+walgreen,+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1#r[14]" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Stallworth v. Okaloosa County School District</em>, United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division 2011</a>, the employee, a classroom assistant, was allowed to proceed under these allegations: the school district eliminated her position, harassed her, intimidated her, and transferred her to positions beyond her physical abilities in retaliation for her filing a workers’ compensation claim under state law. Because there was no dispute that Stallworth filed a workers’ compensation claim, that her position was eliminated, and that administrators knew of her injury and complaints, the court decided that she set forth a <em><a href="http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/prima+facie" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">prima facie</a></em> case.</p>



<p>Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated, the burden then shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. <em>See </em><a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18185359668396517924&q=chase+v+walgreen,+co.&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Russell [v. KSL Hotel Corp.</em>, 887 So.2d 372, 379-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004</a>).</p>



<p>Section 440.205 cases are extremely fact intensive. Disgruntled employers can be clever at devising legitimate reasons for its actions other than retaliation. Also coming into play is Florida’s status as an <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=at+will+employment&rls=com.microsoft:en-US:IE-Address&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=ie7&rlz=1I7ADFA_enUS477&gws_rd=ssl" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">at-will employment state</a> and the <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Welcome/index.cfm?CFID=32438262&CFTOKEN=8b7069ae99f3b8a5-340DD1B5-A4B7-9599-0E7F8814853A80A6" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Legislature’s</a> repeal, in 2003, of Chapter 440’s “obligation to rehire” mandate.</p>



<p>*********************</p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> toll free at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale // Florida Statute 440.205 Workers’ Compensation Retaliation/Wrongful Termination COA (Prong #1)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-florida-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-440-205/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/jeffrey-p-gale-p-a-florida-workers-compensation-wrongful-termination-440-205/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2015 20:46:39 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Florida is an at-will employment state. The doctrine often allows employers to end employment relationships without suffering any negative consequences besides paying unemployment compensation benefits. While the doctrine creates a climate of vulnerability, Florida employers do not have absolute immunity for every termination decision. They can find themselves in hot water for This blog will&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Florida is an <a href="http://www.naplesnews.com/community/marco-eagle/its-the-law-florida-is-an-employment-at-will" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">at-will employment state</a>. The doctrine often allows employers to </p>


<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/09/terminated-225x300.jpg" alt="terminated" style="width:225px;height:300px"/></figure></div>


<p>end employment relationships without suffering any negative consequences besides paying <a href="http://www.floridajobs.org/job-seekers-community-services/reemployment-assistance-center/claimants/file-an-initial-claim" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">unemployment compensation benefits</a>.</p>



<p>While the doctrine creates a climate of vulnerability, Florida employers do not have absolute immunity for every termination decision. They can find themselves in hot water for
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>harassing or terminating an employee because of his or her <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protected_class" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">protected member</a> status (e.g., race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex);</li>



<li>retaliating against an employee for engaging in <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0448/Sections/0448.102.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">whistleblowing activities</a> (<em>also</em>, <a href="http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-whistleblower.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">US Dept. of Labor</a>);</li>



<li>retaliating against an employee for seeking benefits under the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/chapter-8" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">FLSA</a>; or</li>



<li>retaliating against an employee for making a valid claim for compensation or attempting to claim compensation under <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">§440.205 Florida Statutes</a> of <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0400-0499/0440/0440ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2015&Title=%2D%3E2015%2D%3EChapter%20440" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Florida Workers’ Compensation Act</a>.</li>
</ul>



<p>
This blog will address the first element of a <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">§440.205</a> retaliatory discharge claim.</p>



<p>Florida does not recognize a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">common law</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tort" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">tort</a> for retaliatory discharge. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=688959669489297006&q=superior+brands,+inc.+v+rogers&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Scott v. Otis Elevator Co.,</em> 572 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1990)</a>. Hence, the statute is the only remedy available to address an employer’s challenged conduct, and since it is in derogation of common law, it must be construed strictly. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4061441931314252359&q=superior+brands,+inc.+v+rogers&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n,</em> 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977)</a>; <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10379129612648642905&q=superior+brands,+inc.+v+rogers&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Jenks v. State,</em> 582 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA)</a>, <em>review denied,</em> 589 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1991).</p>



<p><a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.205.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">§440.205</a> reads as follows:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p><strong>Coercion of employees.</strong>—No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
In order to prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim under §440.205 of the <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0400-0499/0440/0440ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2015&Title=%2D%3E2015%2D%3EChapter%20440" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Workers’ Compensation Laws, Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes</a>, the employee must prove: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the employee’s protected activity. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18185359668396517924&q=Russell+v.+KSL+Hotel+Corp&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp</em>., 887 So.2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)</a>; and <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15263011901036264083&q=Bruner+v.+GC-GW+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Humphrey v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co.,</em> 192 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2002)</a>.</p>



<p>In <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12842062394387113443&q=Bruner+v.+GC-GW+Inc&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Naboa v. The Sygma Network, Inc</em>., United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division 2012)</a>, the court rejected the Defendant Employer’s argument that the statute or case law compel an employee to file an official workers’ compensation <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.192.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Petition for Benefits</a> to be protected by the retaliation statute. Instead, it found that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when he reported his work related injury, filled out the Defendant’s corresponding paperwork, and was taken to a clinic by supervisors pursuant to Defendant’s established procedure for workers’ compensation injuries.</p>



<p>This standard is important because Petitions are not always filed in workers’ compensation cases, including those involving significant injuries. When employers and their workers’ compensation insurance companies furnish  benefits in accordance with the law, there is no need to file a Petition. Hence, to require a Petition to invoke the protections of §440.205 would cause unnecessary litigation and hardship.</p>



<p>Another issue involves the meaning of the statutory term “valid claim.”</p>



<p>It is not uncommon for employers to challenge the compensability of accidents. In <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1169408484001718413&q=smalbein+v.+volusia+county&hl=en&as_sdt=40006&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Smalbein v. Volusia County School Board</em>, 801 So.2d 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)</a>, the employee involved in a car crash claimed workers’ compensation benefits. The employer denied responsibility under the <a href="http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.092.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">“going or coming”</a> rule and prevailed on this defense in the <a href="http://www.jcc.state.fl.us/jcc/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">workers’ compensation forum</a>.  Thereafter, the employee filed a §440.205 civil action against the employer, asserting retaliation for removing his name from the substitute teacher list. The trial court granted the Employer Defendant’s <a href="http://phonl.com/fl_law/rules/frcp/frcp1510.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">motion for summary judgment</a>, concluding that, by losing the underlying workers’ compensation case, the Plaintiff was not engaged in a statutorily protected activity.</p>



<p>On appeal, Florida’s <a href="http://www.5dca.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Fifth District Court of Appeal</a> vacated the summary judgment, agreeing with Smallbein’s argument that the term “valid claim” under section 440.205 should not be construed as a requirement that the workers’ compensation claim be compensable. In the court’s view
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>interpreting “valid” as “compensable” thwarts the purpose and intent of the Legislature to prohibit retaliation whereas construing a valid claim as a meritorious one provides the proper protection to injured employees seeking benefits without over-extending the protection to employees who file frivolous claims. <u>801 So.2d @ 170</u>. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>
These cases demonstrate a reasonable reluctance against chilling an employee’s right to seek workers’ compensation benefits in meritorious cases.</p>



<p>Stay tuned for additional blogs on the subject of §440.205 retaliation claims.</p>



<p>*********************</p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> toll free at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[440.205 Workers’ Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Claims May be Subject to Arbitration]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/440205-workers-compensation-re/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/440205-workers-compensation-re/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 13 Oct 2013 11:50:51 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Florida Statute 440.205 creates a civil remedy for various types of retaliatory misconduct by employers against employees for claiming or attempting to claim workers’ compensation. (Florida’s workers’ compensation statutes are contained in Chapter 440.) 440.205 reads as follows: Coercion of employees.–No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/06/scales.jpg" alt="scales.jpg" style="width:166px;height:112px"/></figure></div>


<p><a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/440.205" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Statute 440.205</a> creates a civil remedy for various types of retaliatory misconduct by employers against employees for claiming or attempting to claim workers’ compensation. (Florida’s workers’ compensation statutes are contained in <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/Chapter440" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Chapter 440</a>.) 440.205 reads as follows:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p><strong>Coercion of employees.</strong>–No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Law.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>Traditionally, civil disputes have been handled by trial courts with judges and juries. (Florida’s civil trial court system consists of county and <a href="http://www.flcourts.org/courts/circuit/cir_description.shtml" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">circuit courts.)</a> Trial courts were imagined by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Founding_Fathers_of_the_United_States" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">America’s Founding Fathers</a> as the most effective way of leveling the playing field in disputes between the small and powerless and the rich and powerful. Juries, composed of citizens from all walks of life, were seen as being in the best position to render fair and impartial verdicts after thoughtfully considering the evidence. Sadly, the recent trend in Florida and nationwide is away from this form of dispute resolution, towards a process known as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">arbitration</a>:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>“Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), is a technique for the resolution of disputes outside the courts, where the parties to a dispute refer it to one or more persons (the “arbitrators”, “arbiters” or “arbitral tribunal”), by whose decision (the “award”) they agree to be bound.” From Wikipedia</p>
</blockquote>



<p> This movement has been fueled by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_business" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Big Business</a> to make it more difficult for individuals to pursue civil remedies against them. <a href="http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=183" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Public Citizen</a>, a public interest non-profit organization, concluded that arbitration may be just as expensive and time-consuming as litigation. In their report, <a href="http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.PDF" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">“The Costs of Arbitration,”</a> the writers found that:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The cost to a plaintiff of initiating an arbitration is almost always higher than the cost of instituting a lawsuit.</li>



<li>Arbitration costs are high under a pre-dispute arbitration clause because there is no price competition among providers. </li>



<li>Arbitration costs will probably always be higher than court costs in any event, because the expenses of a private legal system are so substantial. </li>



<li>Arbitration saddles claimants with extra fees they would not be charged if they went to court. </li>



<li>Arbitrators tend to favor repeat customers. Naturally, large companies with frequent litigation select the arbitrators who rule in their favor. </li>



<li>Taking a case to arbitration does not guarantee that a consumer or employee will stay out of court, making arbitration still more costly. If crucial documents or testimony must come from a third party, court litigation is necessary to enforce subpoenas.</li>



<li>The inability to exclude irrelevant evidence since the “Rules of Evidence” are discretionary with the arbitrator</li>



<li>The loss of the right to appeal erroneous decisions.</li>
</ul>



<p>The bottom line is that arbitration is often bad for the little guy. Plaintiffs’ lawyers prefer having matters resolved in trial courts. They don’t always have the choice.The subject of how arbitration becomes mandatory is beyond the scope of this blog. In most instances, it boils down to contract law. However, it is prohibited in some types of cases, such as workers’ compensation.</p>



<p>In <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17684241142195322210&q=audio+visual+innovations,+inc.+v.+spiessbach&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Audio Visual Innovations, Inv. v. Spiessbach</em></a>,   So.3d   , 38 FLW D1753 (Fla. 2nd DCA 8-16-2013), the question arose as to whether arbitration could be compelled in a <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/440.205" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">440.205</a> workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge case. The employer sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a dispute resolution agreement that Spiessbach had signed when he was hired. The <a href="http://www.2dca.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Second DCA</a> agreed with the employer, finding that a Section 440.205 claim, which is pursued in circuit court, is a completely separate cause of action that is outside the Ch. 440 mechanism for providing workers’ compensation benefits.</p>



<p>************************************************</p>



<p><strong>Contact us</strong> toll free at 866-785-GALE or by email (jgale@jeffgalelaw.com) for a free, confidential consultation to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p><strong>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</strong> is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Determining Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/determining-regular-rate-of-pa/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/determining-regular-rate-of-pa/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jun 2011 10:03:39 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Overtime Wages (FLSA)]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay employees overtime pay, at a rate of time and a half, for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. See Section 207 of the Act. To calculate the amount of compensation an employee is owed under the FLSA, the overtime rate (OT&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><a href="/static/2015/06/worker.jpg" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"></a></p>


<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/06/worker.jpg" alt="worker.jpg" style="width:140px;height:93px"/></figure></div>


<p>The <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/29/usc_sup_01_29_10_8.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)</a> requires employers to pay employees overtime pay, at a rate of time and a half, for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. <em>See</em> <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/29/usc_sec_29_00000207----000-.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Section 207 </a>of the Act.</p>



<p>To calculate the amount of compensation an employee is owed under the FLSA, the overtime rate (OT rate) must be determined.</p>



<p>The first step in this equation is establishing the “regular rate of pay,” the hourly rate. If the employee has not received employer-furnished fringe benefits, such as health insurance and housing, the “regular rate of pay” is the hourly rate, and the OT rate is 1/2 of the hourly rate. For example, if the “regular rate of pay” is $10.00/hour, the overtime rate is $5.00.</p>



<p>Where fringe benefits have been provided, their value must be included in the calculation. In the case of health insurance, the fringe benefit value determination is relatively simple to make, with the employer’s share of the premium payment being the actual “value” of the fringe benefit. Where the employer is not making an easily identifiable payment, such as in the case of self-administered medical programs provided by some big emloyers, or where housing is provided by the employer, determining the value of the benefit is not as simple. Not infrequently, the parties will fight over the value of fringe benefits. (Caveat: the employer may try to argue that the fringe-benefit is a form of payment for overtime wages, rather than a benefit which increases the “regular rate of pay.” Paycheck stubs and tax records, among other evidence, must be considered to resolve this dispute.)</p>



<p>Where fringe benefits are part of the calculation, determining the OT Rate is a 3-step process:
</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p><strong>Step 1 – Regular Weekly Pay:</strong> Hourly rate of pay times (x) hours worked per week plus (+) value of fringe benefit(s). (Example: $10/hr x 62 hours + $50 (weekly insurance premium.))</p>



<p><strong>Step 2 – Regular Rate of Pay:</strong> Regular Pay divided (/) by hours per week.</p>



<p><strong>Step 3 – OT Rate: </strong>Equals 1/2 of Regular Rate of Pay.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>
Compensation due under the FLSA is determined by multiplying the OT Rate by the employee’s number of accrued overtime hours. The FLSA statute of limitation is 2 or 3 years depending on whether the employer’s failure to pay overtime wages was by purposeful design or through simple oversight or ignorance.</p>



<p>The FLSA also contains a liquidated damages provision for double damages.</p>



<p><strong>Hypothetical Case:</strong> Employee worked an average of 62 hours a week during the 3-year period immediately preceding his case being filed in court, with an hourly rate of pay of  $10.00. The employer also paid the equivalent of $50 per week for health insurance.
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>OT Hours: 3432 (156 weeks (3 years) x 22 (OT hours/wk))</li>



<li>Regular Weekly Pay: $670 (Hourly pay x total hours + fringe benefit)</li>



<li>Regular Rate of Pay: $10.80 (Regular Weekly Pay divided by hours per week)</li>



<li>OT Rate: $5.40 (1/2 of Regular Rate of Pay)</li>



<li>OT Owed: $18,532.80 (OT Rate x OT Hours)</li>



<li>Liquidated Damages: $18,532.80</li>



<li><strong>Total Owed: $37,065.60</strong></li>
</ul>



<p>**********************************************************</p>



<p>Contact us toll-free at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your rights.</p>



<p><strong>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.</strong> is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p>While prompt resolution of your legal matter is our goal, our approach is fundamentally different. Our clients are “people” and not “cases” or “files.” We take the time to build a relationship with our clients, realizing that only through meaningful interaction can we best serve their needs. In this manner, we have been able to best help those requiring legal representation.</p>



<p>Members of our firm speak English, Spanish, and Creole.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Florida Workers’ Compensation – Shifting Permanent Total Disability (PTD) Standard]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/florida-workers-compensation-2/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/florida-workers-compensation-2/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 14 May 2011 10:25:50 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Permanent Total Disability (PTD) (440.15(1)) is the most valuable wage loss benefit available under Florida’s workers’ compensation system. Unlike Temporary Partial Disability (TPD) (440.15(4)) and Temporary Total Disability (TTD) (440.15(2)), monetary benefits that are available for only a short period of time, PTD can last for years and includes an annual supplemental increase equal to&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Permanent Total Disability (PTD) <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2010/440.15" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">(440.15(1)) </a> is the most valuable wage loss benefit available under Florida’s workers’ compensation system. Unlike Temporary Partial Disability (TPD) (440.15(4)) and Temporary Total Disability (TTD) (440.15(2)), monetary benefits that are available for only a short period of time, PTD can last for years and includes an annual supplemental increase equal to 3 percent of her or his weekly compensation rate.</p>



<p>The PTD standard has changed numerous times over the years. Until 1996, the standard was to meet a scheduled catastrophic injury, like total blindness or loss of limbs, or prove the inability to perform at least light duty work uninterruptedly on a full-time basis. In 1996, the light duty standard was replaced by the standard required to qualify for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits, which the Florida Legislature believed was more demanding. In 2002, thanks to Governor Jeb Bush, the SSD standard was replaced by an even more stringent standard. Injured workers would be required to prove that they could not perform at least sedentary duty work on a part-time basis within a 50 mile radius of their homes. This standard prevented all but the most catastrophically injured workers from qualifying for PTD.</p>



<p>Because this standard proved so onerous… and unfair, the Florida Legislature was  persuaded to eliminate the part-time element from the PTD requirement in its 2006 version of 440.15.</p>



<p>Pre-1996, one of the ways claimants proved entitlement to PTD benefits was by performing an exhaustive but unsuccessful job search. Because of the many variations in the standard since then, many workers’ compensation practitioners believed that this method no longer applied and abandoned it as a way of proving entitlement to PTD.</p>



<p>Thankfully, in <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8149205827233750951&q=blake+v+merck&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Blake v. Merck & Co</em>.,</a> 43 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) the assumption was proven wrong. The <em>Blake</em> court set forth three alternative methods by which a claimant may prove entitlement to PTD benefits: by presenting evidence of (1) permanent medical incapacity to engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s residence, due to physical limitation; (2) permanent work-related physical restrictions coupled with an exhaustive but unsuccessful job search; or (3) permanent work-related physical restrictions that, while not alone totally disabling, preclude Claimant from engaging in at least sedentary employment when combined with vocational factors.Confirmation of this method as a way of proving PTD is important to injured workers. In many PTD cases, especially those where the claimant’s injuries are less than catastrophic, this method is the most effective way of proving PTD.</p>



<p>Other considerations:
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The claimant is not required to present direct proof of a causal connection between his physical limitations and his unsuccessful job search. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=936050495526503032&q=Fla.+Mining+and+Minerals+v.+Brantley&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Fla. Mining and Minerals v. Brantley</em></a>, 418 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). </li>



<li>The job search must be conducted in good faith and it is within the JCC’s discretion to find a job search inadequate. Factors such as physical impairment, age, industrial history, training, education, motivation, work experience, work record, and diligence will be considered. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9483991477623384877&q=Publix+Supermarkets,+Inc.+v.+Redding&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Redding</em></a>, 689 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2140649148554531076&q=Borges+v.+Osceola+Farms+Co&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>Borges v. Osceola Farms Co</em></a>., 651 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).</li>



<li>There is no absolute number of minimum or average monthly contacts as a threshold requirement for an adequate work search. <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3298029015550706391&q=GCC+Beverages+v.+Simmons&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><em>GCC Beverages v. Simmons</em></a>, 571 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). </li>
</ul>



<p>***********************************************</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p><strong>Contact us at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights. </strong></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Exception to the Major Contributing Cause (MCC) Doctrine – Florida Workers’ Compensation]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/exception-to-the-major-contrib/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/exception-to-the-major-contrib/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 21 Mar 2011 18:24:21 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Insurance Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Since the establishment of a workers’ compensation system in Florida more than 80 years ago, business and insurance interests have steadily tried to whittle away workers’ rights with varying degrees of success. The high water mark for them arrived in the late 1990s with the election of Jeb Bush as Florida’s Governor. For the next&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[

<p>Since the establishment of a workers’ compensation system in Florida more than 80 years ago, business and insurance interests have steadily tried to whittle away workers’ rights with varying degrees of success. The high water mark for them arrived in the late 1990s with the election of Jeb Bush as Florida’s Governor. For the next eight years, injured workers absorbed one crippling body blow after the other from Bush and his merry band of right-wing zealots in the Florida Legislature anxious to maximize the profits of the business community at the expense of individual rights. (Jeb adopted for Florida many of the measures that his brother George before him had imposed in Texas during his reign as that state’s Governor. Get the picture?)</p>


<p>One of the more onerous examples of rights-limiting workers’ compensation imposed in Florida is set forth at <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2010/440.09" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Section 440.09(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes. </a> This section, known as the Major Contributing Cause (MCC) Doctrine, places the burden on injured workers to prove that the industrial accident is more than 50% responsible for causing the injury.  An injured worker who fails to meet this burden will be denied ALL medical care and lost wage benefits from the employer. (In contrast, the personal injury system does not summarily deny compensation to persons with pre-existing conditions whose injuries were activated, i.e., made to become symptomatic, or aggravated (permanently worsened) by an accident. Instead, the finder of fact carves out the pre-existing element from the recovery and awards the difference. Not so under Bush’s MCC system.)</p>


<p>The MCC is used as a defense in many cases. The E/C try to blame 50% or more of a claimant’s injury on a pre-existing condition. For older workers and those with similar prior complaints, the defense can be difficult to overcome. Sadly, many an injured worker has been denied workers’ compensation benefits because of the MCC.</p>


<p>Fortunately, the First District Court of Appeal has carved out an important exception to the MCC doctrine. In <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5883871339224683014&q=pearson+v+paradise+ford&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Pearson v. Paradise Ford</em>, 951 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)</a>, the court held that an employee need not meet the rigorous MCC requirements when her or his pre-existing condition is occupationally related.In other words, pre-existing conditions resulting from compensable work-related accidents will NOT be a factor in the denial of workers’ compensation benefits under the MCC doctrine.</p>


<p>This example illustrates the complexity of Florida’s workers’ compensation system, and demonstrates the importance of consulting with a workers’ compensation specialist following an industrial accident.</p>


<p>Our law firm has been handling workers’ compensation for nearly 25 years. <strong>Please contact us today to arrange a free, confidential consultation to discuss your case. </strong></p>


<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>


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                <title><![CDATA[Florida Workers’ Compensation Attorney’s Fees – Round II (Emma Murray; Jennifer Kauffman)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/florida-workers-compensation-a/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/florida-workers-compensation-a/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 16 Feb 2011 08:47:11 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Miscellaneous]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>At the urging of Governor Jeb Bush, Florida’s Republican-controlled legislature in 2002 passed a workers’ compensation bill designed to limit carrier-paid attorney’s fees to claimants’ attorneys. The measure was challenged in the courts by claimants (injured workers), who argued that it was unconstitutional (denied access to courts & equal protection) and that it should be&hellip;</p>
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<p>At the urging of Governor Jeb Bush, Florida’s Republican-controlled legislature in 2002 passed a workers’ compensation bill designed to limit carrier-paid attorney’s fees to claimants’ attorneys. The measure was challenged in the courts by claimants (injured workers), who argued that it was unconstitutional (denied access to courts & equal protection) and that it should be interpreted to allow for “reasonable” attorney’s fees.</p>


<p>Five years after the bill’s effective date, the <a href="http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Supreme Court</a>, in <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1303203787033836718&q=murray+v+mariners&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>Murray v. Mariner Health and Ace USA</em></a>, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), held that the statute provided for reasonable attorney’s fees. The court did not rule on the constitutional issues.</p>


<p>In a clear rebuke to the Florida Supreme Court, in it’s next legislative session, which began on March 1, 2009, less than seven months after the <em>Murray</em> decision, the still-again Republican-controlled legislature took another shot at limiting fees. What it did was remove the word “reasonable” from <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2010/440.34" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Florida Statute 440.34.</a> The Legislature’s goal was to make it difficult for injured workers to obtain adequate legal representation by denying their attorneys reasonable attorney’s fees.</p>


<p>In the <em>Murray</em> case, Ms. Murray was successful at the trial level in convincing a judge of workers’ compensation claims (JCC) that her injuries were sustained in a work-related accident. (The employer/carrier (e/c) had denied her injuries.) In a subsequent attorney’s fee hearing, the JCC found that claimant’s counsel expended eighty hours of reasonable and necessary time on the case. However, the JCC, although concluding in his written order that $16,000 was a reasonable fee, felt constrained by the statute and awarded only $684.84, or an hourly rate of $8.11. According to the JCC, this amount was “manifestly unfair.” (Note: the e/c in this case paid their attorney $16,050 (135 hours at $125 an hour) in the unsuccessful effort to resist paying benefits.) It was this order that was appealed and eventually made its way to the Florida Supreme Court. As a result of the decision, Ms. Murray’s attorney was awared $16,000 for his efforts at the trial level.The Supreme Court’s decision angered the Florida Legislature, the insurance industry, and big business. Their answer was to enact legislation denying reasonable attorney’s fees to claimants’ attorneys. Governor Charlie Crist allowed the legislation to become law. Hence, the stage was set for another challenge to the legislature’s mean-spirited handiwork.</p>


<p>On July 23, 2009, Jennifer Kauffman sustained an injury to her low back while attempting to transfer a patient into a recliner chair, when she lost her balance and fell backwards onto her buttocks and back. The accident was not witnessed and the employer investigated and disputed the claim. Ms. Kauffman hired an attorney and a claim was filed. The trial on the merits of the petition determined that all of the E/C’s defenses were denied and that the claim was compensable.</p>


<p>At a subsequent fee hearing, Ms. Kauffman’s attorney presented uncontroverted evidence of spending in excess of 100 hours to successfully prosecute the claim. The JCC found that “both parties vigorously and aggressively represented their respective parties’ interests,” and the “presentation of the evidence from both sides was difficult and complex.” Expert testimony was given that a reasonable rate of $200-$450 per hour was awarded within the jurisdiction in other types of cases. Nevertheless, the JCC felt bound by the statute and awarded a fee of $648.41, less than $7.00 per hour.</p>


<p>The JCC’s order has been appealed (<em>Jennifer Kauffman v. Community Inclusions and Guaranty Insurance</em>). The challenges involve constitutional issues and matters of statutory interpretation. Oral arguments were held on January 13, 2011 in the <a href="http://www.1dca.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">First District Court of Appeal</a>, the first stop before reaching the Florida Supreme Court. As of the time this blog was posted, the 1st DCA had not issued its opinion.</p>


<p>If allowed to stand in its present form, 440.34 will have a chilling effect on the willingness of claimants’ lawyers to accept workers’ compensation cases and to handle them effectively.</p>


<p>Our law firm will continue to accept workers’ compensation on behalf of injured workers. However, we are hoping that the First District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court see fit to level the playing field to allow for the fair and effective prosecution of claimants’ cases.</p>


<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>


<p><strong>Please contact our office for a free, confidential consultation.</strong></p>


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                <title><![CDATA[Wage/Income Loss Claims for “Illegal Immigrants”/Undocumented Workers in Florida Personal Injury and Workers’ Compensation Cases]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/wage-loss-claims-for-illegal-i/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/wage-loss-claims-for-illegal-i/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 2010 13:23:39 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Litigation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Personal Injury]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The question often arises in Florida as to whether undocumented workers can be compensated for lost wages (past and future) in personal injury and workers’ compensation cases. With few exceptions, the answer appears to be No. Although the damages available in workers’ compensation and personal injury cases may differ, both offer elements of awards for&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-image alignright">
<figure class="is-resized"><img decoding="async" src="/static/2015/06/worker.jpg" alt="worker.jpg" style="width:135px;height:180px"/></figure></div>


<p>The question often arises in Florida as to whether undocumented workers can be compensated for lost wages (past and future) in personal injury and workers’ compensation cases. With few exceptions, the answer appears to be No.</p>



<p>Although the damages available in workers’ compensation and personal injury cases may differ, both offer elements of awards for lost wages. Proving entitlement requires showing that the lost wages are related to the injuries. However, the employer (wc) and defendant (pi) may nullify the proof by establishing that the claimant is prohibited from working in the United States due to immigration issues. In other words, an immigrant who is not authorized to work in the United States, cannot be compensated under Florida law for lost income resulting from an accident.</p>



<p>The two primary exceptions in workers’ compensation cases are (1) the employee is totally, as opposed to partially, unable to work because of his injuries, and (2) the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s status as an unauthorized alien prior to the disabling accident. (The law of Florida does not impose on an employer the burden of verifying forged or borrowed green cards – <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0448/Sections/0448.09.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><strong>Florida Statute 448.09 </strong></a>– nor is there any such federal requirement.)The first exception applied in the first workers’ compensation case that I handled, a number of years ago. My client, who was blind in one eye, was struck in his good eye by the end of a whipping electric cord. The impact caused his retina to detach, leading to blindness in the good eye and overall total blindness. My client was a nice young man from the Bahamas, who had lived and worked in America for many years, but had never obtained the proper paperwork to work here legally. Nevertheless, despite resistance from his employer and its insurance carrier, I was able to obtain wage loss benefits for him, both temporary (prior to maximum medical improvement) and permanent (PTD; after reaching MMI).</p>



<p>I am unaware of any exceptions in personal injury cases. (Because of workers’ compensation immunity, <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0400-0499/0440/Sections/0440.11.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><strong>Florida Statute 440.11</strong></a>, very few personal injury cases are brought against employers. However, in those rare instances where the immunity can be overcome, I believe that exception (2) would apply.)</p>



<p>Plaintiffs in personal injury cases should be cautious about pursuing lost wages past and future. Even if the trial court allows the claim to proceed, which is probably judicial error and therefore highly unlikely, the strategy could backfire. A wage claim by an unauthorized worker opens the door for the defendant to discuss the plaintiff’s undocumented immigration status. Especially in today’s social climate, jurors may well punish the plaintiff, not only denying the wage claim but also denying legitimate claims for pain & suffering and medical expenses.</p>



<p>For the plaintiff’s attorney willing to push the issue, an effort should be made to obtain a pre-trial court order prohibiting any reference to the plaintiff’s undocumented immigration status. Where the judge is allowing the claim for lost wages to be presented to the jury, it is doubtful that he will also prohibit references to immigration status.</p>



<p><strong>UPDATE:</strong> <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2345994156836984256&q=hdv+construction+systems,+inc.+v.+aragon&hl=en&as_sdt=2,10&as_vis=1" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><em>HDV Construction Systems, Inc. v. Aragon</em></a>,  So.3d  , 36 FLW D1376 (Fla.1st DCA 6-28-2011). In this workers’ compensation case, the District Court of Appeal upheld (affirmed) the ruling of the JCC (Judge of Compensation Claims) awarding an illegal immigrant permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. The DCA was strongly persuaded by the employer’s knowledge, prior to the accident, of the worker’s status as an undocumented alien. The court felt that industry, rather than the public, should bear the burden of compensating individuals seriously injured while working on their behalf. The ruling confirms the legislature’s intent to keep the burden on industry, despite federal law.</p>



<p>******************************************************</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to rotecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>



<p><strong>Contact us at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</strong></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Damages Under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/damages-under-the-family-medic/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/damages-under-the-family-medic/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 22 Aug 2010 12:07:43 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States Congress has declared that the purpose of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), located in Chapter 28 of Title 29 of the U.S. Code , is “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests&hellip;</p>
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<p>The United States Congress has declared that the purpose of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), located in <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/usc.cgi?ACTION=BROWSE&TITLE=29USCC28&PDFS=YES" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Chapter 28 of Title 29 of the U.S. Code </a>, is “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity.” Section 2601(b)(1).</p>



<p>To meet this goal, the FMLA is designed “to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. Section 2601(b)(2).</p>



<p>An employer who violates the FMLA, may be required to compensate a damaged employee as follows:
</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Pay money damages equal to the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or</li>



<li>In a case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee, pay any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary for the employee;</li>



<li>Pay the interest on the amount described in the first bullet point calculated at the prevailing rate; and</li>



<li>Pay an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in first bullet point and the interest described above, except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of section 2615 of this title, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest, respectively; and</li>



<li>Provide such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.</li>
</ul>



<p>The employee has a duty to mitigate damages, in other words, diligently seek new employment. Failure of the employee to do so may preclude an award of back pay for the period during which employment was not sought. <em>See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T Corp</em>., 250 F.3d 820, 838 (4th Cir. 2001).</p>



<p>The award available under the first bullet point is considered compensatory or actual damages. Actual damages differ significantly from the liquidated damages award under the FMLA. Instead of being actual damages, the liquidated damages are a penalty for failing to act in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing that its act or ommission was not a violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 2615. Importantly, the burden is upon the employer to prove both elements.What constitutes good faith and resonable grounds is beyond the scope of this blog. The variations and subleties are endless. However, at the very least the employer must inform the employee of his/her rights under the FMLA. “Federal law requires that the employer notify the employee of FMLA entitlements and employee obligations through its employee handbook and <em>also</em> provide the employee with written notice detailing the specific expectations and obligations of the employee and explaining the consequences of a failure to meet the obligations.” <em>Patterson v. Browning’s Pharmacy & Healthcare, Inc., </em>961 So.2d 982 (5th DCA 2007), citing to 29 C.F.R. Section 825.301(a)(1), (b)(1). “The notice shall be given within a reasonable time after notice of the need for leave is given by the employee – within one or two business days if feasible.” <em>Patterson</em> court, referring to Section 825.301(c).</p>



<p>FMLA issues are complex. An employee with concerns should seek legal assistance.</p>



<p>************************************************</p>



<p>Contact us at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>



<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[ACL Tear – Florida Workers’ Compensation (and Personal Injury) Law]]></title>
                <link>https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/acl-tear-florida-workers-compe/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.jeffgalelaw.com/blog/acl-tear-florida-workers-compe/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 2010 10:57:30 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Employment Law]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Miscellaneous]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Personal Injury]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Workers' Compensation]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) is one of the most frequently injured ligaments in the human body. The typical mechanism of the injury is a non-contact twisting movement, usually due to abrupt deceleration and change of direction. Side-stepping (cutting), pivoting and landing from a jump are examples of events that may cause an ACL tear.&hellip;</p>
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<p>The anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) is one of the most frequently injured ligaments in the human body. The typical mechanism of the injury is a non-contact twisting movement, usually due to abrupt deceleration and change of direction. Side-stepping (cutting), pivoting and landing from a jump are examples of events that may cause an ACL tear.</p>


<p>ACL tears can be partial or complete. A complete tear of the ACL has minimal ability to heal and often requires surgical reconstruction, as most patients suffer from functional problems, like giving way and instability, and significant pain. To a lesser extent, partial tears also produce pain and instability. There is serious debate within the medical and workers’ compensation communities about the need for surgical intervention for partial tears.</p>


<p>ACL reconstruction involves replacing the torn ligament, usually with the middle third patellar tendon or hamstring tendon graft. Although most people benefit from ACL reconstruction in functional terms, approximately 10% of patients require a second operation, mainly because of the loss of motion, further meniscal injury and graft failure. ACL reconstructions are not very successful in the long-run in people with chronic meniscal and chondral deficiency.</p>


<p>As ACL injuries typically occur in the context of physical activity, it is a common injury  among manual laborers, individuals whose job duties include signficant amounts of climbing, lifting, squatting, and carrying.</p>


<p>Due to instability and pain associated with complete tears, manual laborers with any hope of returning to the work force will almost always require surgery and comprehensive post-surgical rehabilitation. Even then, a successful return to long-term gainful employment is not assured. Repetitive trauma associated with hours of manual labor on a daily basis can lead to pain and hasten the need for additional surgery.Even attempting to return to manual labor on a partial ACL tear can prove problematic. Repetitive trauma will cause pain and, in many instances, lead to greater tearing, even to a complete tear.</p>


<p>Florida’s workers’ compensation system is not especially kind to individuals whose injuries prevent them from performing their regular job duties. Even under the best of circumstances (e.g., a competent and fair doctor; a fair employer), the most a recovering worker can expect are a limited amount of lost wage benefits and employer/carrier-controlled medical benefits. Except in rare instances <a href="https://www.floridainjuryattorneyblawg.com/2010/06/workers-compensation-permanent-1.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">(i.e., Permanent Total Disability)</a>, once   maximum medical improvement <a href="http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0440/SEC02.HTM&Title=-2009-Ch0440-Section%2002#0440.02" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">(see Florida Statute Section 440.02(1) for the definition of MMI)</a> has been reached, monetary benefits will end no matter the long-term consequences of the injury on the injured worker’s ability to perform his/her regular job duties.</p>



<p>************************************************</p>





<p>Contact us at 866-785-GALE or by email to learn your legal rights.</p>




<p>Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. is a South Florida based law firm committed to the judicial system and to representing and obtaining justice for individuals – the poor, the injured, the forgotten, the voiceless, the defenseless and the damned, and to protecting the rights of such people from corporate and government oppression. We do not represent government, corporations or large business interests.</p>


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